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Abstract: This essay explores the broader context of the Spanish army’s 
Moroccan campaigns during the first decades of the twentieth century and the 
relatively peaceful period of occupation thereafter. It does so by comparing the 
military history of Spain in Morocco with that of other countries. The aspects of 
colonial military history that this essay examines include the frequently 
inconclusive nature of the campaigns, the links between “hard” and “soft” 
military methods of conquest and occupation, and the role of cultural perceptions 
in shaping military behavior after the major combat operations have ended. It 
argues that the Spanish military leaders initially shared with their European 
counterparts a tendency to think in conventional terms, elevate tactics to the 
level of strategy in response to the elusiveness of decisive outcomes, and to 
neglect the political components of modern war, especially in its colonial 
manifestations. The essay also makes an argument for studying military 
conquest and post-conflict occupation and administration as part of the same 
historical process, and it explores the changing relationship between kinetic and 
non-violent methods employed by the armed forces throughout this process.  
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Resumen: Este artículo explora el contexto general de las campañas marroquíes 
del ejército español durante las primeras décadas del siglo XX y el período 
relativamente pacífico de ocupación posterior. Lo hace comparando la historia 
militar de España en Marruecos con la de otros países. Los aspectos de la historia 
militar colonial que examina el texto incluyen la naturaleza muchas veces 
inconclusa de las campañas, los vínculos entre los métodos militares "duros" y 
"blandos" de conquista y ocupación, y el papel de las percepciones culturales a la 
hora de modelar las conductas militares cuando el grueso de las operaciones llegó 
a su fin. Se argumenta que los líderes militares españoles inicialmente 
compartieron con sus homólogos europeos una tendencia a pensar en términos 
convencionales, elevar las tácticas a nivel de estrategia en respuesta a la ausencia 
de victorias decisivas, y descuidar los componentes políticos de la guerra 
moderna, especialmente en sus manifestaciones coloniales. El ensayo también 
presenta un argumento para estudiar la conquista militar y la ocupación y 
administración después del conflicto como parte del mismo proceso histórico, al 
tiempo que explora la cambiante relación entre los métodos cinéticos y no 
violentos empleados por las fuerzas armadas a lo largo de este proceso. 
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lthough long overshadowed by the imperial campaigns of other European 
powers, the Spanish military presence in twentieth-century North Africa has 
attracted some noteworthy scholarly attention, especially over the last few 
decades.1 Admittedly, many accounts still focus on traditional operational 
history, and they often reveal the lingering influence of colonialist perspectives. Oth-
ers, however, go well beyond “guns-and-trumpets” military history to analyze the 
wars in their political, social, and cultural contexts, while eschewing the blatant orien-
talism of the past.2  
                                                          
* Many thanks to Jochen Arndt, Irene González González, Alberto Guerrero, Sasha Pack, and the anony-
mous outside readers for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. I am also grate-
ful to Alfonso Iglesias Amorín and the editors of RUMH for inviting me to participate in this special issue. 
This article was supported by the Spanish government-funded research project “Hacía un estudio compara-
tivo del colonialismo español en África y de sus efectos en las poblaciones colonizadas de Guinea Ecuatorial 
y del Rif,” directed by Paz Moreno Feliu, UNED (HAR2016-79164-P). 
1 Thorough, albeit somewhat dated, surveys of research on Spain in Morocco are María Rosa de MADA-
RIAGA: “Los estudios sobre el Protectorado español en Perspectiva”, in Bernabé LÓPEZ GARCÍA and 
Miguel HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI (eds), Historia y memoria de las relaciones hispano-marroquíes. 
Un balance en el cincuentenario de la Independencia de Marruecos, Sevilla, Ediciones del Oriente y del Medite-
rráneo, 2007, pp. 21-44, and Vicente MOGA ROMERO: La cuestión marroquí en la escritura africanista: una 
aproximación a la contribución bibliográfica y editorial española al conocimiento del norte de Marruecos (1859-
2006), Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2006. See also Alicia CAMPOS SERRANO, Irene GONZÁLEZ and Francesco 
CORREALE: “Spanish Colonial Rule,” Oxford Bibliographies, 28 Aug 2018, and Rocío VELASCO DE 
CASTRO: “Presentación: Las relaciones hispano-marroquíes: tendencias e investigaciones”, NORBA. Re-
vista de Historia, vol. 29-30 (2016-2017), pp. 11-15. 
Many thanks to Jochen Arndt, Irene González González, Alberto Guerrero, Sasha Pack, and the anony-
mous outside readers for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. I am also grate-
ful to Alfonso Iglesias Amorín and the editors of RUMH for inviting me to participate in this special issue. 
This article supported by the Spanish government-funded research project “Hacía un estudio comparativo 
del colonialismo español en África y de sus efectos en las poblaciones colonizadas de Guinea Ecuatorial y del 
Rif,” directed by Paz Moreno Feliu, UNED (HAR2016-79164-P) 
2 On the traditionalist focus of much military historiography of Spain in Morocco, Manuela MARÍN: Testi-
gos coloniales: españoles en Marruecos (1860-1956), Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2015, p. 13. In fact, for decades 
some of the leading books covering the Spanish military campaigns in the Maghreb have in fact gone well 
beyond the confines of traditional operational military history. For example, David S. WOOLMAN: Rebels 
in the Rif: Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968; C.R. PENNELL: A 
Government with a Country and a Flag. The Rif War in Morocco 1921-1926, Wisbech MENAS, 1986 (rev. 
 
A 
The Spanish-Moroccan Military Campaigns….                                                                  Geoffrey Jensen 
 
 
RUHM Vol. 8, Nº 16 (2019), pp. 17 – 40 ©                          ISSN: 2254-6111                                          20 
 
Yet despite the many merits of the new scholarship, it has largely ignored the 
place of Spain’s military experiences in Morocco in the wider history of modern Euro-
pean imperial warfare and military occupation. General histories of colonial armies 
and warfare during this period sometimes incorporate examples from the Spanish zone 
of the Moroccan protectorate, but most historians whose work focuses on these wars 
do not return the favor and analyze the conflict in the context of colonial warfare in 
general.3 The same can be said about most scholarship on the Spanish military’s role 
in Morocco after the suppression of significant organized armed resistance in 1927. 
Historians have acknowledged the French influence on the Spanish officers who po-
liced, administered, gathered intelligence, and set policies in Morocco, but we still lack 
thorough and systematic comparative studies of the Spanish and French forms of oc-
cupation in North Africa.4 This historiographical void mirrors the insufficient under-
standing by political and military leaders throughout history of the importance and 
complexities of military occupation in general.5  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Spanish edition: La guerra del Rif. Abdelkrim el-Jattabi y su estado rifeño, Melilla, UNED-Centro Asociado de 
Melilla, 2011); Shannon E. FLEMING: Primo de Rivera and Abd-el-Krim: The Struggle in Spanish Morocco, 
1923-1927, New York, Garland, 1991; María Rosa de MADARIAGA: España y el Rif. Crónica de una histo-
ria casi olvidada, Melilla, Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla and UNED-Centro Asociado de Melilla, 1999; and 
Sebastian BALFOUR: Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
3 For example, V. G. KIEMAN: Colonial Empires and Armies, 1815-1960, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s Univer-
sity Press, 1998, pp. 203-205, and Dierk WALTER: Colonial Violence: European Empires and the Use of 
Force, trans. Peter LEWIS, London, Hurst, 2017. The frequent comparisons in Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 
with the French military in the Maghreb and Shannon Fleming’s suggestion that historians of the Rif War 
view the conflict as a “frontier war” are exceptions to the general tendency to eschew transnational compar-
isons. Sebastian BALFOUR: Deadly Embrace, and Shannon E. FLEMING: “The Rif War as a Frontier 
Conflict”, in Brian D. BUNK, Sasha D. PACK, and Carl-Gustaf PACK (eds.), Nation and Conflict in Mod-
ern Spain. Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne, Madison, Parallel Press, 2008, pp. 123-136, 
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History.NatCon (accessed 24 February 2019). For a brief analysis of 
the Moroccan campaigns in the context of other Spanish imperial military actions, see Stephen JACOB-
SON: “Imperial Ambitions in an Age of Decline: Micromilitarism and the Eclipse of the Spanish Empire, 
1858-1923”, in Alfred W. MCCOY, Josep M. FRADERA, and Stephen JACOBSON (eds.), Endless Empire: 
Spain’s Retreat, Europe’s Eclipse, America’s Decline, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012, pp. 74-
91, 87-91. 
   “Spanish Morocco” was technically not a colony but instead consisted of a “zone of Spanish influence” in 
France’s Moroccan protectorate. But Spanish colonos nonetheless settled there, and the theoretical distinc-
tion between a protectorate and a colony (which also applied to the French in Morocco) does not preclude 
interpreting the Spanish military experience in Africa in the context of European colonial wars in Africa. 
4 Although military history is not its primary focus, Sasha D. Pack gives a brief summary comparison of the 
two zones after 1927. Sasha D. PACK: The Deepest Border: The Strait of Gibraltar and the Making of the Mod-
ern Hispano-African Borderland, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2019, pp. 179-180. Balfour, Deadly 
Embrace, makes scattered references and some valuable comparisons to the French case and its possible 
influence on the Spaniards, but the book’s aim is not a thorough or systematic comparison. 
5 In 2003, for example, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded incredulously to a general’s 
suggestion that the occupation of Iraq might require as many troops as defeating the country’s armed forc-
es in war. In Rumsfeld’s view, it was “not logical” that post-combat occupation would require more troops 
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In fact, warfighting and occupation are often components of the same process 
sharing the same long-term goal, and flawed military occupations can nullify the 
grand strategic benefits that the wars that preceded them were supposed to bring 
about.6 Moreover, studying wars and occupations together makes sense from the 
standpoint of the historical protagonists themselves; in the Spanish zone of the Mo-
roccan protectorate, for example, many of the same people who waged war against 
Moroccans also had a hand in carrying out the more peaceful aspects of the Spanish 
imperial project. Nonetheless, the cultural-political and the more traditional, kinetic 
aspects of the military endeavors are rarely analyzed together.  
With the aim of filling some of the scholarly lacuna, this essay explores ways of 
contextualizing Spain’s Moroccan campaigns beginning in 1909 and the army’s role in 
the relatively peaceful period of occupation after the end of significant armed re-
sistance in 1927. It does so by comparing aspects of the military history of Spain in 
Morocco with the colonial military history of other countries. It is not feasible here to 
consider all the comparative possibilities, and this article limits itself primarily to sec-
ondary sources. Nonetheless, even this admittedly tentative and incomplete analysis 
can help to identify themes in the Spanish military history of North Africa that lend 
themselves to profitable comparison with other imperial wars and occupations, there-
by shedding light on Spain’s place in modern European military and imperial history 
and pointing out possible avenues for future scholarship. Typically, studies of military 
actions and behavior treat war and post-war occupation separately or skim over one 
or the other. This essay, however, treats them as part of the same historical process. 
For the Spaniards in North Africa, any barrier between combat and “peaceful” mili-
tary actions was largely artificial; viewing them together in the broader context of 
European colonial military history thus helps us to understand both the war and the 
occupation. The characteristics of colonial military history that this essay examines 
include the frequently inconclusive character of colonial wars, the relationship be-
tween “hard” and “soft” military methods of conquest and occupation, and the role of 
cultural perceptions in shaping military behavior after the major combat operations 
have ended. The article limits itself to the colonialist perspective; a full comparative 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
than those needed to win the combat phase of the conflict. David M. EDELSTEIN, Occupational Hazards: 
Success and Failure in Military Occupations, Ithaca (NY), Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 164. 
6 On the importance of military occupations in interpreting the long-term success or failure of wars, see 
ibídem Admittedly, most studies of military occupation by political scientists define it in such a way as to 
exclude colonial situations. Edelstein, for example, argues that the «critical distinction between occupation 
and colonialism» lies in how the occupying powers define their goals, especially the intended length of the 
occupation. Ibídem, 3-4. Nonetheless, the military perceptions, problems, aims, and means of colonial ar-
mies in conquered territories do not have to differ significantly from those of more narrowly defined occupa-
tion forces, as the period immediately following the Rif War illustrates. For a wide-ranging survey of exam-
ples of military occupation in history that encompasses colonial and non-colonial situations, see Eric 
CARLTON: Occupation: The Policies and Practices of Military Conquerors, New York, Routledge, 1992. 
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history would also entail consideration of those who took arms against the European 
armies.  
 
Patterns of Colonial Warfare 
 
Dierk Walter offers a framework of European colonial warfare that can serve as 
a useful starting point for analyzing the Spanish-Moroccan campaigns from a compar-
ative perspective. Walter maintains that the fundamental patterns of colonial warfare 
have remained basically the same for centuries, going as far as to suggest that these 
patterns persist even in today’s (nominally) postcolonial world. According to Walter, 
as a rule peripheral wars—a designation including colonial wars and more recent neo-
colonial military interventions—have been “temporally, spatially, and structurally 
open-ended, primarily political conflicts.”7 As we will see, in most ways Walter’s as-
sertion applies to the Spanish campaigns in Morocco.  
Temporally, the Spanish army’s efforts to suppress armed resistance were in-
deed open-ended, at least until the 1920s. From 1909 until then, the Spanish army 
repeatedly undertook military operations that in themselves had scant hope of bring-
ing a definitive end to violent opposition to Spain’s presence, even if they did provide 
temporary solutions to local Spanish security dilemmas. As was common in European 
militaries then, Spanish commanders had been taught to seek out the kind of decisive 
defeats on the battlefields that European military culture of the day expected, but 
this proved especially difficult in North Africa.8 Spanish writings may have portrayed 
Spanish military campaigns in monumental terms, but in fact they had scant grand 
strategic significance. The inconclusiveness of the Spanish army´s actions was in no 
small part an outgrowth of the nature of the Spanish-Moroccan conflict as a whole, 
which consisted of a combination of retaliatory strikes, battles, and individual cam-
paigns of limited aims. Some military commanders may have worked toward the gen-
eral goal of gradually extending territorial control through use of the “oil spot” meth-
od associated with Hubert Lyautey—whom Spaniards explicitly praised—and with 
                                                          
7 Dierk WALTER: op. cit., pp. 265-266. On his conception of “war on the periphery” see ibídem, chapter 1. 
This article makes use of only a small portion of Walter’s analytical framework.  
8 On the problematic nature of the decisive battle in colonial warfare, see Hugh STRACHAN: “A General 
Typology of Transcultural Wars – the Modern Ages”, in Hans-Henning KORTÜM (ed.), Transcultural 
Wars from the Middle Ages to the 21st Century, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2006, pp. 85-103: 93, and Dierk 
WALTER: op. cit., pp. 30-31, 207-208. On the evolution of decisive battles in history and historiography, 
see Yuval Noah HARARI: “The Concept of ‘Decisive Battles’ in World History”, Journal of World History, 
18:3 (2007), pp. 251-266. 
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more recent counterinsurgency campaigns.9 But until well into the Rif War there was 
no clear consensus between or within the centers of Spanish civil and military power 
on the overall goal of the Spanish military actions or how to achieve it—in other 
words, the strategy to adopt. For Spanish business interests the primary aim was suf-
ficient security and a political situation congenial to the profitable extraction of natu-
ral resources; for leading military africanistas—many of whom derided such capitalist 
motives—it was a matter of national and imperial pride, professional advancement, 
and a chauvinistic desire to keep the French from infringing on “Spanish” territory; 
and for the government in Madrid it was the need to satisfy all these goals but also to 
maintain international treaty obligations, with the emphasis fluctuating as the politi-
cal constellation in Madrid frequently changed and leading ministers changed their 
minds on strategy.10  
The socio-political makeup of the Spanish zone also hindered the Spaniards’ at-
tempts to achieve definitive military victories. Decentralized and lacking strong, pow-
erful leaders, the zone did not offer the kind of strategic targets upon which the mili-
tary could focus its efforts. Thus, with the exception of the Sharif Muley Ahmed el 
Raisuni in the western zone, there was no equivalent to the “great Qaids” of the 
French zone who could serve as a primary focus for the Spanish military and political 
efforts.11 
In 1909, for example, the Spanish military operation near Melilla was a re-
sponse to the killing of six Spanish railway workers, an act of local resistance that 
grew out of the elimination of the regional warlord and pretender to the throne of Mo-
rocco, Bou Hmara, also referred to as El Rogui (the pretender), who had alienated 
some of the locals by selling mining concessions to Spaniards.12 In other words, a pow-
er vacuum set the stage for the attack on Spanish interests that sparked the military 
campaign. But Spain was unable to identify a political-military Schwerpunkt, or center 
of gravity, of the kind that European armies typically sought in hopes of winning a 
decisive victory, and the Moroccans astutely avoided providing such a target. With-
out that kind of vital point against which to concentrate their forces, the Spanish op-
                                                          
9 Pedro MAESTRE: Divulgación y orientación del problema de Marruecos. Intervención civil, intervención 
militar, Granada, La Publicidad, 1924, pp. 53-54; Sebastian BALFOUR: op. cit., p. 54,  
10 María Rosa de MADARIAGA: En el Barranco del Lobo. Las guerras de Marruecos, Madrid, Alianza, 2006, 
pp. 51-52; Sebastian BALFOUR: op. cit., pp. 28-30, 43-44. 
11 María Rosa de MADARIAGA: En el Barranco del Lobo…, p. 97. 
12 On the mining concessions and Bu Hmara, see Ross E. DUNN: "Bu Himara's European Connection: The 
Commercial Relations of a Moroccan Warlord", Journal of African History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1980), pp. 235-
253, and ibid., "The Bu Himara Rebellion in Northeast Morocco: Phase I", Middle Eastern Studies, 17: 1 
(1981), pp. 31-48. For a clear and concise operational history of the 1909 campaign and its antecedents from 
the Spanish perspective, see Roberto MUÑOZ BOLAÑOS: “La Campaña de 1909”, in Antonio CARRASCO 
(ed.), Las campañas de Marruecos (1909-1927), Madrid, Almena, 2001, pp. 9-72. 
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erations of 1909 added up to little more than a localized attempt to put down an inde-
pendently-fueled insubordination and slightly extend the area under Spain’s control. 
As the General Staff´s study of the campaign conceded, the lack of “a regular and 
well-defined enemy” not only made it difficult to distinguish between enemy and 
friendly forces, but it also “diminished the consequences of battlefield victories.”13 The 
Spanish operations may have deterred Moroccan resistance for a time, offering some 
assurance of the continued exploitation of natural resources from the area, and they 
served political purposes in the metropole by demonstrating an energetic response to 
the well-publicized tragedy of the ambush at Wolf Ravine (Barranco del Lobo). But 
the army’s actions alone could hardly have achieved control of the Spanish zone as a 
whole, as subsequent events would soon demonstrate. Similarly, the Kert River (1911-
1912), Jebala (1913-1920), and Melilla (1912-1919) campaigns remained mostly tacti-
cal affairs, the components of which were often reactions to separate instances of Mo-
roccan resistance or French pressure that did not add up to a well thought-out and 
coordinated strategy.14 Eventually, the addition of “political” methods to the military 
endeavors in the Jebala and Melilla campaigns—consisting of the common colonial 
military practice of making payments in return for loyalty—betrayed the uncomfort-
able truth that force alone would not suffice, even if many military and political lead-
ers still failed to digest the implications of this fact fully.  
Until the mid-1920s, the Spanish-Moroccan campaigns thus remained, to use 
Walter´s language, “open-ended”—a feature of colonial warfare in general. Indeed, in 
his classic turn-of-the-century manual of colonial warfare, Small Wars: Their Princi-
ples and Practice, British army officer Charles Callwell had noted that “such cam-
paigns are most difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion.”15 In many peripheral 
wars, moreover, the unfulfilled hope for a decisive military action that would elimi-
nate all armed resistance contributed to the sense of frustration that fueled a tendency 
toward extreme methods, as happened in the colonial campaigns of other European 
forces. In nineteenth-century South Africa, for example, British frustrations in deal-
                                                          
13 «La falta de un enemigo regular y definido, pues la lucha es contra las cabilas del territorio en que se com-
bate y aun contra otras que se agregan á ellas, dificulta la determinación de qué habitantes son hostiles y 
cuáles pacíficos, y merma el resultado á los combates victoriosos, que será preciso hacer más efectivo que en 
las personas, en sus intereses, á los cuales aman tanto como á su fe.» Estado Mayor Central del Ejército: 
Enseñanzas de la Campaña del Rif en 1909, Madrid, Talleres del Depósito de la Guerra, 1911, p. 11.  
14 On Spanish military tactics in the Moroccan campaigns, José Vicente HERRERO PÉREZ: The Spanish 
Military and Warfare from 1899 to the Civil War, Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, chapter 3; 
Alberto GUERRERO MARTÍN: “Los procedimientos tácticos en las campañas de Marruecos”, Guerra 
colonial, 3 (2018) http://www.guerracolonial.es/medias/files/3.3.-los-procedimientos-tacticos-en-las-
campanas-de-marruecos-3.pdf (accessed 25 February 2019); and Andrés CASINELLO PÉREZ: “El ejército 
español en Marruecos. Organización, mandos, tropas y técnica militar”, in Manuel ARAGÓN REYES (ed.), 
El protectorado español en Marruecos. La historia trascendida, Bilbao, Iberdrola, 2013, pp. 271-279. 
15 C. E. CALLWELL: Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice, London, General Staff – War Office, 1906, 
quoted in Ian BECKETT: “Introduction”, in Modern Counterinsurgency, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, xii. 
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ing with guerrilla warfare in South Africa had fueled the employment of “total war” 
measures against the Xhosa, and this tendency of course had its antecedents in Napo-
leonic Spain and elsewhere as well.16 
The Spanish experience in the Moroccan protectorate shared other common 
patterns of European colonial wars. In theory, the Spanish army was not at war with 
Morocco but solely with those rebellious Moroccans who resisted the authority of the 
Sultan, whose domains Spain and France were “protecting.”17 To regard the Moroccan 
“insurgents” otherwise would have accorded them a legitimacy that contradicted the 
recognition of the Makhzan’s unitary sovereignty, and it would have affected Spain’s 
own claim to authority and legitimacy in the zone. From a solely military perspective, 
this situation resembled that of other imperial European powers during the twentieth 
century. In such cases the colonial army often did not fight a centralized state with a 
“national” army, capital city, or other easily discernible strategic focus point (at least 
to European eyes). Thus the Europeans often either failed to think beyond tactical 
actions, such as the limited Spanish campaigns of 1909 and thereafter, or they elabo-
rated strategies based on the more “total” methods of economic and other unre-
strained forms of warfare, as exemplified by the Germans in southwest Africa.18 
Even interpreting the results of battlefield actions can be difficult in peripheral 
wars. Before the defeat of ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi (best known in the West as Abd 
el-Krim), the Spaniards did not always agree whether certain military actions served 
strategic goals, in no small part because the relationship between the military, politi-
cal, and territorial aims remained unclear, making it difficult if not impossible to de-
fine a national strategy in the first place.19 Like in many other imperial wars, within 
the military sphere the relationships between tactical, operational, and military-
strategic goals were also muddled. In concert with what often occurred in colonial 
campaigns, for the Spaniards in Morocco battlefield victories scattered over time and 
space were more likely to stem from reactions to new security threats or imperial ri-
                                                          
16 Dierck WALTER: op. cit., pp. 82-85, 266; Jochen ARNDT: “Treacherous Savages and Merciless Barbari-
ans: Knowledge, Discourse, and Violence during the Cape Frontier Wars, 1834 -1853”, Journal of Military 
History 74:3 (2010); Wayne LEE: Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare 1500-1865, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2011; and Isabel V. HULL: Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices 
of War in Imperial Germany, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004. For another view of German warfare in 
Africa, see Susanne KUSS: German Colonial Wars and the Context of Colonial Violence, Cambridge, Mass, 
Harvard University Press, 2017. 
17 Daniel MACÍAS FERNÁNDEZ: “Las campañas de Marruecos (1909-1927)”, Revista Universitaria de 
Historia Militar 3: 2 (2013), pp. 58-71: 59-60; María Rosa de MADARIAGA: En el Barranco del Lobo…, p. 
103; Juan PANIAGUA LÓPEZ: “La red de servicios secretos españoles durante la guerra del Rif (1921-
1927): los Servicios Especiales Reservados dirigidos por Ricardo Ruíz Orsatti”, Historia contemporánea, 57 
(2018), pp. 491-521, 493. 
18 Susanne KUSS: op. cit. 
19 On the ambiguities of Spanish aims in Morocco, Sasha D. PACK: op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
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valry than from a comprehensive strategy, which was largely lacking in the first place. 
In the terminology of today’s counterinsurgency theorists, the Moroccan insurgents 
were locally-based actors with limited territorial goals and little or no connection to a 
country-wide centralized organization or outside central state. On the other side, the 
Spanish army’s tactical actions did not come together sufficiently well at the opera-
tional level of war to bring strategic victory. Even when some military leaders such as 
General Dámaso Berenguer finally devised well thought-out plans on paper, realities 
on the ground hindered their development into successful strategies.20  
Furthermore, the disconnect between Spain´s military opponents in North Af-
rica and the Moroccan state cast doubt on the effective scope of any possible armistice 
or peace treaty. (Abd el-Krim’s self-proclaimed Rif Republic was a telling exception, 
as we will see.) In the meantime, and as the Spanish military and political leadership 
would eventually learn, victory required the integration of tactical aims into broader 
operational and strategic planning. The limited nature of what Callwell categorized as 
“Campaigns to wipe out an insult or avenge a wrong” did not suffice.21 Coinciding 
with the decline of the decisive battle in regular continental warfare, in colonial wars–
whether in Spanish Morocco or elsewhere in Africa—a single engagement rarely served 
to resolve a metropole’s military-imperial predicament. For this reason, assessing the 
success of military actions was also problematic, especially without conscious and sys-
tematic analysis of the relationship between tactical, operational, and strategic aims.  
Paradoxically, it was Abd el-Krim’s ability to unite various peoples of North-
ern Morocco during and in the wake of his massive rout of Spanish forces that began 
near Annual (Anwāl)—the largest defeat of a European colonial army in twentieth-
century Africa—that helped make it possible for the Spaniards to establish military 
control of the zone.22 Not only did the unprecedented alliance of many normally di-
vided Moroccan factions under Abd el-Krim impel the Spaniards to transform their 
“Army of Africa” into such a large and effective fighting force, but the unification of 
the many factions under Abd el-Krim greatly magnified the consequences of the Rifi-
ans’ setbacks when they began to occur, fueling a remarkably singular disintegration 
of military power. By bringing together groups that had previously fought separately 
and for their own interests, he dramatically demonstrated the potential of strength 
through unity. But once the Rifians were fighting together and—perhaps more im-
portantly—linked at least somewhat politically, a military defeat at the hands of the 
                                                          
20 Sebastian BALFOUR: op. cit., p. 54. 
21 C. E. CALLWELL: op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
22 Recent military histories of the Annual “disaster” include Julio ALBI DE LA CUESTA: En torno a An-
nual, Madrid, Ministerio de Defensa, 2016; and Fernando CABALLERO ECHEVARRÍA: Intervencionismo 
español en Marruecos (1898-1928): Análisis de factores que confluyen en un desastre militar, Annual, PhD. 
thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2013. 
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Europeans would have far greater consequences. Thus when the Spanish army began 
to win against Abd el Krim’s forces, the same kind of snowball effect that had facili-
tated the overwhelming defeat of the Spaniards at Annual in 1921 now worked in re-
verse: large numbers of his erstwhile allies submitted to the Spaniards and changed 
sides in relatively rapid succession, thereby setting the stage for the final definitive 
establishment of Spanish military control of the entire zone. Political centralization 
had significant military consequences. The uncharacteristically high degree of central-
ization of Abd el Krim’s military movement, which saw the Spaniards lose control of 
virtually their entire zone except the major cities, ironically made it possible for the 
Spanish Army of Africa to deviate from Walter’s norm and solve the Moroccan “prob-
lem” decisively.23  
It is worth remembering, however, that the finality of the last battle of the Rif 
War was relatively rare. Until then, the Spanish military actions not only tended to 
be open-ended, but they shared other characteristics with much European colonial 
warfare. Because of what Walter calls the “internal logic” of imperialism, for example, 
the military budgets of France and Britain naturally favored metropolitan armies 
over their colonial counterparts. Admittedly, Spain differed from richer European 
countries in that its metropolitan military force did not suck up resources in prepara-
tion for a possible large-scale, regular war against another great European continental 
power. But even without the danger of entering into a major European conflict, 
Spain’s metropolitan forces received most of the country’s military budget, and the 
Spanish Army of Africa was, like many other colonial forces, underfunded and badly 
equipped.24 The Spanish forces also joined other colonial armies in facing formidable 
logistical challenges when operating in Africa.25 
The scant resources were not just material but human too, and Spain, like 
France, Britain, and Portugal, had to rely on indigenous manpower in order to con-
quer its enemies and maintain control. This use of “native” troops was of course a 
fundamental characteristic of colonial warfare in Africa, and in the twentieth century 
the Spaniards used them from the 1909 campaign onwards. Another reason for the 
primarily political and open-ended nature of imperial armed conflict was the irregular 
style of warfare that indigenous forces tended to favor, the extensive space that was 
often at their disposal, and the corresponding rarity of traditional, set-piece battles in 
colonial campaigns. And as we have seen, the dispersed social and political organiza-
                                                          
23 On the final battle of the Rif War, see Julián PANIAGUA LÓPEZ: “La última batalla de la Guerra del 
Rif,” Guerra colonial, 3 (2018), http://www.guerracolonial.es/medias/files/3.4.-la-ultima-batalla-del-rif-3.pdf 
(accessed 25 February 2019). 
24 Sebastian BALFOUR: op. cit., pp. 53, 55. 
25 Susanne KUSS: op. cit. 
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tion—often described as “tribal”— of Spanish Morocco and other colonial lands made 
it more difficult to bring wars to a conclusive resolution.  
 
Atracción política, acción política, and penetración política 
 
The failure of European armies to recognize what Walter calls the “primarily 
political” nature of colonial warfare also contributed to the elusiveness of decisive mil-
itary actions. Twentieth-century revolutionary guerrilla warfare, or “insurgency,” 
would grow out of what Ian Beckett describes as the “fusion of traditional guerrilla 
tactics with political and, especially, ideological objectives.”26 In reaction, twentieth-
century colonial armies learned to develop and employ the methods of what we now 
call counterinsurgency, with clear political and “hearts-and-minds” or “psychological” 
components.27 In this way as well, the Spanish case fit the European colonial military 
model.  
During the early campaigns in Morocco, many Spanish military and political 
leaders failed to grasp that the solution to the Moroccan problem would have to be 
political as well as military. Although the official study of the 1909 campaign had 
stressed the necessity of following up military victory with occupation and “uniting 
political and commercial action with that of arms,” influential officers would continue 
to favor an almost-exclusive emphasis on the use of military force.28 In the meantime, 
the political sophistication and ideological ingredients of the anti-Spanish struggles 
continued to grow, reaching their peak under Abd el-Krim. Only then did leading 
Spanish military officers fully grasp that politics—broadly defined to include cultural, 
social, economic, and ideological factors —would have to play a significant role in 
winning the Rif War and, above all, maintaining control thereafter. Until then, and 
for many officers even thereafter, the importance of political factors paled in compari-
son to the use of traditional military force. 
At the time, in Spanish military writings the term “political” referred to non-
kinetic steps that aided in gaining control of Morocco; indeed, the methods of “politi-
                                                          
26 Ian BECKETT: op. cit., p. xiii. 
27 “Hearts and minds,” widely associated with Cold War British counterinsurgency, did not in fact exclude 
the use of force, in spite of the widespread perception to the contrary. Here we use it, like the French mili-
tary concept of “action psychologique” to refer to methods aimed at winning over people emotionally and 
intellectually, rather by force or not. For a critical history of the term and concept of “hearts and minds,” 
see Paul DIXON: “‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq”, Journal of Stra-
tegic Studies, 32:3 (2009), pp. 353-381.  
28 Estado Mayor Central: Enseñanzas…, p. 14. 
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cal action” were often described in explicit contrast to those of “military action.”29 Of 
course, the use of the word “political” to denote all non-violent methods did not in 
itself create or explain Spanish military views or doctrines, the latter of which were 
based above all on a combination of military culture, concrete experiences, practical 
concerns, and foreign influence—especially that of the French. But the pejorative use 
of the words “politics” and “political” does shed light on the mindsets of those Span-
ish officers, including future dictator Francisco Franco, whose interest in the political 
and cultural elements of conquest and military occupation would always remain su-
perficial.30 
In particular, the use of the adjective “political” to describe the controversial 
policy of paying subsidies to local Moroccan leaders and elites in order to retain their 
support, a practice that the Spaniards dubbed “atracción política” (“political attrac-
tion”), offers a linguistic clue about Spanish military sentiments toward the non-
violent methods subsequently associated with “civil affairs” and counterinsurgency in 
its softer forms. The buying-off of potential enemies had a long history in the protec-
torate—even Abd el-Krim’s father had benefited from such payments—and it was 
hardly uncommon among European armies.31 But the perception that paying for do-
cility and loyalty constitutes a dishonorable “political” act corresponded to the nega-
tive views many Spanish officers held then toward politics in general. In the eyes of a 
growing number of influential military figures, parliamentary politics threatened the 
very essence of the patria they had sworn to defend.32 In Morocco, these officers criti-
cized their colleagues and politicians back in Madrid—who had conveniently served as 
scapegoats for military mishaps since at least the Cuban war—for promoting the prac-
tice of atracción política, which they regarded as a dishonorable and ultimately self-
defeating.33 
Of course, neither a disdain for civilian politics nor the creation of a Dolchstoss-
legende blaming civilian politicians for military losses was unique to Spain. Moroccan 
resistance to the Spanish presence was not a purely military problem, and the solution 
would thus need political as well as military components. But this realization did not 
                                                          
29 For example, Pedro MAESTRE: Divulgación... 
30 See, for example, Franco’s article in the Revista de Tropas Coloniales in April 1924, quoted in María Rosa 
de MADARIAGA: En el Barranco del Lobo…, pp. 338-339 
31 María Rosa de MADARIAGA: Abd-el-Krim El Jatabi: La Lucha por la Independencia, Madrid, Alianza, 
2009 y En el Barranco del Lobo…, pp. 107-113. On what the US military calls “civil affairs,” see Raymond 
MILLEN: “Bury the Dead, Feed the Living”: The History of Civil Affairs/Military Government in the Mediter-
ranean and European Theaters of Operation During world War II, Carlisle (PA), Peacekeeping and Stability 
Operations Institute, 2019. 
32 For a bitter satire of Spanish parliamentary politics by a future Spanish High Commissioner in Africa, see 
Capitan X [pseudonym for Ricardo Burguete]: Así hablaba Zorrapastro. Un libro para nadie y para todos, 
Valencia, F. Sempere, [no year].  
33 Sebastian BALFOUR: op. cit., pp. 59-60.  
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come naturally to many army officers. It is perhaps not a coincidence, moreover, that 
some of the same officers who gave less credence to the cultural, economic, and politi-
cal components of conquest and pacification were also particularly vocal in their dis-
satisfaction with civilian politicians back in Spain. Francisco Franco and José Millán-
Astray, for example, strongly criticized their more enlightened military colleagues 
who diverged from the force-based military approach they advocated in Morocco, and 
they publicly opposed civil authorities whom they deemed insufficiently committed to 
a robust program of military action in the protectorate.34 Admittedly, there were also 
influential, perceptive, and relatively enlightened Spanish officers, such as Tomás 
García Figueras, Osvaldo Capaz, José Villalba Riquelme, and Alberto Castro Girona, 
who understood that more than brute force was necessary, and they attained consid-
erable respect and influence in the armed forces.35 Indeed, there had long been a small 
but vocal segment of the officer corps that sought to bring attention to the strategic 
benefits of political and cultural endeavors in the protectorate. Officers such as García 
Figueras and Riquelme, for instance, vociferously advocated a more culturally-based 
approach to military expansion in North Africa, and the army set up schools and oth-
er programs and institutions aimed at Moroccan civilians. Indeed, when Spanish busi-
ness interests attempted in 1911 to set up their own schools for Moroccans in the pro-
tectorate, Spain’s military authorities reacted vigorously against such threatened en-
croachment into their educational domain.36 The army even set up schools for Moroc-
can children in areas only partially controlled by Spain, categorizing them as “ad-
vanced schools.” The ideas of these more culturally-oriented officers also figured heav-
ily in the thinking in the development in the system of interventores, whom we discuss 
below.37  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, leading Spanish military 
figures mostly viewed resistance in Morocco, which often took the form of guerrilla 
warfare, as a military problem, and the growing anti-liberal segment of the officer 
corps after 1898 came out of the culture that these leading Spanish officers helped 
shape. The failure of more officers to give credence to non-kinetic methods was of 
course a common feature of military cultures everywhere, reflecting the core institu-
tional purpose of armies. During the first half of the twentieth century, for example, 
                                                          
34 Gustau NERÍN: La guerra que vino de África, Barcelona, Crítica, 2005, pp. 49, 56. 
35 Ibídem; María Rosa de MADARIAGA: Abd-el-Krim…, pp. 141, 152-153, 168-172; Sebastian BALFOUR: 
op. cit.; Vincent SHEEAN: An American Among the Riffi, New York, Century, 1926, p. 240; C. R. PEN-
NELL: “The responsibility for Anual”, European Studies Review, XII (1982). 
36 Victor RUIZ ALBÉNIZ (el Tebib Arrumi): España en el Rif, Madrid, 1921, pp. 164-72; Geoffrey JEN-
SEN: “Toward the ‘Moral Conquest’ of Morocco: Hispano-Arabic Education in Early Twentieth-Century 
Morocco”, European History Quarterly, 31:2 (2001), pp. 205-229. 
37 Irene GONZÁLEZ GONZÁLEZ: Spanish Education in Morocco 1912-1956: Cultural Interactions in a Co-
lonial Context, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2015. On the “advanced schools,” see ibídem, pp. 53-55. 
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the German high command tended to disregard the political (and strategic) elements 
in war, the writings of Clausewitz on this topic notwithstanding.38 Of course, no one in 
the Spanish military advocated renouncing the use of force all together, and even the 
more liberal officers understood that violence and the threat thereof would have to 
play major roles in pacification. But many other officers could conceive of using noth-
ing but traditional military methods to achieve their goals; suggestions to the contra-
ry could trigger scorn from their colleagues.39  
There was also a tendency to conceive of military and political-cultural meth-
ods as belonging to wholly distinct and separate spheres rather than comprising two 
sides of the same coin, with unfortunate consequences for Spanish strategy. Even 
when officers acknowledged the importance of both spheres, they often portrayed 
them as separated by an impenetrable barrier A novel from the 1930s by one of 
Spain’s most influential military africanistas, Tomás García Figueras, vividly illus-
trated the dichotomy between the “hard” and “soft” schools of colonial warfare in 
Spanish military culture. In the opening section of the book, an officer who wants to 
use generosity, reason and the values of Spanish-Arabic brotherhood to secure peace 
in the protectorate clashes with a hardened Spanish Legion veteran, who believes that 
the only way to end the conflict is through the use of brute force, which in his eyes is 
the only thing the “Moors” are capable of understanding.40  
This dichotomous outlook precluded the kind of holistic approach to strategy 
that integrates cultural, social, economic, political and intelligence-related endeavors 
with traditional, force-based military actions, adjusting the relative emphasis accord-
ing to the circumstances. Not without reason, Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” has 
received renewed attention in Western military thinking since the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001 and corresponding growth in interest in irregular, asymmetrical, 
and hybrid warfare. Rather than concentrating solely on the employment of tradi-
tional military force or separating politics and war into separate domains, the famous 
Prussian military philosopher conceived of wars as the interplay of three kinds of forc-
es: violence, which he associated with popular passions; the realm of probability and 
chance, within which the military commander operates; and the political direction of 
the government. War, he wrote, was like a pendulum hanging between the three ele-
ments of the trinity, with each exerting a pull upon it. Thus military success depended 
upon more than lines of operations, firepower calculations, the maneuver of troops, 
and other standard elements of military art and science. If we accept Walter’s charac-
terization of colonial war as “primarily political,” then Clausewitz’s trinity, with its 
                                                          
38 Isabel V. HULL: op. cit. 
39 Gustau NERÍN: op. cit., pp. 49, 56. 
40 Tomás GARCÍA FIGUERAS: Ramadán de paz, Larache, Editora Marroquí, 1946. 
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strong consideration of non-military factors, is especially apt, as is his characterization 
of war as an extension of policy. But the commanders of colonial armies made little if 
any attempt to incorporate Clausewitz into their military thinking, with the im-
portant exception of their shared belief in the importance in war of morale and 
fighting spirit—what the Prussian theorist called “moral” factors.  
It is telling that one of the primary architects of the successful conclusion of 
the war against Abd el-Krim, General Manuel Goded Llopis, made a point of portray-
ing Spain’s eventual as a multi-phase process involving violent and nonviolent mili-
tary actions. For him, a combination of firepower, better tactics, operations and strat-
egy, logistics, administration, intelligence, the collecting of weapons, changing cultur-
al perceptions, and the setting up of effective administrative, judicial, and economic 
structures all played roles in the process, which he significantly framed within a chro-
nology that extended well past the military defeat Abd el Krim’s forces and his cap-
ture. In other words, he regarded the political end state an integral part of the overall 
military project. He did not go as far as to argue that non-violent methods predomi-
nated or even equaled traditional military actions in importance, but he acknowledged 
the former to a much higher degree that most high-level Spanish officers then. Signifi-
cantly, his long book recounting the “stages of the pacification” of Morocco extended 
beyond the Rif War to include the methods and tasks of post-conflict occupation as 
well.41  
Regardless of Goded’s insights, however, the tendency to separate “military” 
and “political action” persisted in the minds of many army officers even after Annual. 
Goded’s relatively holistic, military-political vision of warfare in the Maghreb was not 
institutionalized, and the dichotomy thus lived on. Although the relative emphasis of 
political, cultural, and kinetic military considerations varied with time, none com-
pletely overshadowed the other. Hence even the periods of intense fighting between 
Spaniards and Moroccans saw influential Spanish military figures advocate the meth-
ods of “peaceful penetration,” while long after the suppression of the Rif rebellion, 
violence and the threat thereof continued to have a place in the Spanish military 
toolbox. From neither a temporal nor a methodological perspective was the shift from 
wartime to postwar occupation abrupt.  
 
 
                                                          
41 General GODED: Marruecos. Las etapas de la pacificación, Madrid, Compañía Ibero-Americana, 1932. 
Goded had a distinguished career in Morocco, playing a key role as a colonel in the large-scale amphibious 
landing at Al Hoceimas (Alhucemas) Bay in 1925 that helped bring about Abd el-Krim´s eventual defeat. 
After his promotion to the rank of general, he then came to head the Spanish general staff in Morocco. In 
1936 he would lose his life as a participant in the military uprising that sparked the Spanish Civil War.  
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Cultural Perceptions and Military Policies of Occupation: A Spanish Exception? 
 
Although the balance between violent methods and the “political” approach in 
the protectorate did not reverse itself overnight, a shift in the army’s overall focus 
after 1927 was unmistakable. After all, conquest differs markedly from occupation 
and administration. Unsurprisingly, the emphasis on cultural and other non-kinetic 
methods increased as the threat of large-scale, organized armed resistance declined. 
Spanish military behavior was then shaped more heavily by ideology, cultural percep-
tions, and the political climate of the Spanish Civil War and thereafter, when the 
Franco regime had to justify its paradoxical use of tens of thousands of Moroccan 
Muslim troops in a conflict it presented as a war against infidels.42  
 On the surface, the history of the Spanish army in Morocco after pacification 
appears to diverge considerably from those of other European colonial armies in simi-
lar positions, unlike the wartime operations that we have analyzed above. Most visi-
bly, the myth of Spanish-Arab brotherhood and the perceptions of shared history, 
geography, culture, and race distinguished Francoist imperialist propaganda from 
that of other European powers, even if there was some overlap with Portugal’s Luso-
tropicalism.43 This brotherhood ideal could not have contrasted more with Germany 
military commander Lothar von Trotha’s characterization of the campaign he led in 
Southwest Africa as part of a worldwide “race war” that would lead to the the utter 
annihilation of blacks.44 Although not that extreme, for the French in the Maghreb 
                                                          
42 Ali Al TUMA: Guns, Culture and Moors: Racial Perceptions, Cultural Impact and the Moroccan Participa-
tion in the Spanish Civil War, New York, Routledge, 2018; Sebastian BALFOUR: op. cit.; J. A. GONZÁ-
LEZ ALCANTUD (ed.): Marroquíes en la guerra civil española. Campos equívocos, Barcelona, Anthropos, 
2003 and Lo moro. Las lógicas de la derrota y la formación del estereotipo islámico, Barcelona, Anthropos, 2002; 
Miguel HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI and Irene GONZÁLEZ GONZÁLEZ: “Islam y colonialismo en 
la España contemporánea”, in Julio de la CUEVA, Miguel HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI and Ana 
PLANET (eds.), Encrucijadas del cambio religioso en España. Secularización, cristianismo e islam, Granada, 
Comares, 2018; Eloy MARTÍN CORRALES: “Entre el ‘moro’ violador y el ‘moro’ seductor. La imagen de 
los marroquíes en la guerra civil según las fuerzas republicanas”, in Ángeles RAMÍREZ and Bernabé LÓ-
PEZ GARCÍA (eds.), Antropología y antropólogos en Marruecos. Homenaje a David M. Hart, Barcelona, Be-
llaterra, 2002, pp. 221-236; and María Rosa de MADARIAGA: Los moros que trajo Franco. La intervención 
de las tropas coloniales en la Guerra Civil Española, Barcelona, Ediciones Martínez Roca, 2002.  
43 Studies of the Spanish-Moroccan brotherhood discourse include Josep Lluís MATEO DIESTE: La her-
mandad hispano-marroquí. Política y religión bajo el Protectorado español en Marruecos (1912-1956), Barcelo-
na, Bellaterra, 2003, and Rocío VELASCO DE CASTRO: “La imagen del ‘moro’ en la formulación e ins-
trumentalización del africanismo franquista”, Hispania, LXXIV:246 (2014), pp. 205-236. On the vision of 
Spanish-Moroccan brotherhood exalted by the prominent officer Ricardo Burguete, who would become 
Spain’s High Commissioner in Africa after Annual, see Manuel MARÍN: Testigos colonials…, p. 52, and 
Geoffrey JENSEN: Cultura militar española: modernistas, tradicionalistas y liberales, Madrid, Biblioteca 
Nueva, 2014, chapter 4. 
44 Jürgen ZIMMERER: “Annihilation in Africa: The “Race War” in German Southwest Africa (1904-1908) 
and its Significance for a Global History of Genocide”, GHI Bulletin, 37 (2005), pp. 51-57. 
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the indigenous peoples were certainly not “brothers” either, and French military writ-
ings about North Africa revealed a stronger tendency toward orientalist views of 
North Africans than those seen in the Spaniards.45 Anti-Moroccan prejudices and rac-
ism clearly existed in the Spanish military, but the widespread perception of deep-
rooted, common historical and racial characteristics made it more difficult for Span-
iards to cast Moroccans in the role of a fully oppositional Other than it was for the 
French.  
If we look deeper, however, we see that in essence the Spanish army as an oc-
cupational force fit the European colonial military mold nearly as well in peace as it 
did in war. Many of the same kinds of perceptions about the occupied lands and their 
peoples found in other colonial military administrators also shaped Spanish behavior. 
The ways in which cultural stereotypes informed Spanish policies in manners similar 
to those of other European colonial powers become clear when we examine the inter-
ventores, key figures in the Spanish enterprise who were almost exclusively career mili-
tary men. They were basically a mixture of colonial administrators, intelligence offi-
cials, security officers, and military recruiters, tasked with fostering economic pro-
gress, education, and loyalty to Spain in their respective districts, while also reporting 
on the political climate and possible threats to Spanish rule.46 The interventores, who 
included such figures as Jesús Jiménez Ortoneda, Capaz, García Figueras, and Emilio 
Blanco Izaga, have been called with good reason the cornerstone of the Spanish pres-
ence in the Maghreb. They resembled France’s “Native Affairs” officers in both form 
and function, although there were also some differences.47 
A field manual meant to guide the interventores in their work sheds light on how 
prejudices shaped occupational policy, as do writings by the interventores themselves 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.perspectivia.net/rsc/viewer/ploneimport3_derivate_00002991/zimmerer_annihilation.pdf?page
=8 (accessed 21 June 2019). 
45 Following Kathleen Biddick, I use the term “alterism” here to mean “belief in the absoluteness of cultural 
and/or historical difference”. Kathleen BIDDICK: The Shock of Medievalism, Durham and London, Duke 
University Press, 1998, p. 206. 
46 José Luis VILLANOVA VALERO: Los interventores. La piedra angular del Protectorado español en Ma-
rruecos, Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2006. Other studies of the interventores include Mateo DIESTE: La ‘herman-
dad’…, especially chapters 2-4.  
47 José Luis VILLANOVA: op. cit.; José Luis VILLANOVA and Luis URTEAGA: “Jesús Jiménez Ortone-
da, Interventor Militar en el Rif (1911-1936)”, Hispania, LXIX:232 (2009), pp. 423-444. David Montgom-
ery Hart draws attention to some of the differences between the interventores and the French native affairs 
officers in his introduction to Emilio Blanco Izaga. David MONTGOMERY HART: Emilio Blanco Izaga: 
Coronel en el Rif, Melilla, Ayuntamiento de Melilla and UNED-Centro Asociado de Melilla, 1995, pp. 41-52. 
See also Vicente MOGA ROMERO: El Rif de Emilio Blanco Izaga. Trayectoria militar, arquitectónica y etno-
gráfica en el Protectorado de España en Marruecos, Barcelona, Bellaterra - Ministerio de Defensa, 2009 [Parte 
II of the book El interventor y sus tribus. La praxis militar y etnográfica en el Rif (1927-1942).] 
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and the textbooks and other documents from the training academy for interventores.48 
The manual linked some of the allegedly innate practices of Moroccans in war and 
peace to Islam, and it suggested that the interventores take advantage of the natural 
tendency toward rivalry and intrigue that it claimed all Moroccans and Arabs shared 
to acquire intelligence and limit the possibility of concerted anti-Spanish actions.49 
Such language echoed that of other European military and intelligence officers in the 
Middle East and North Africa, reflecting typical Western stereotypes. The influence of 
the French on the Spanish military africanistas, especially the latter’s perception of 
the bureaux arabes in Algeria, was especially strong.50 
The enhanced role of the interventores reflected a more general recognition of 
the importance in non-kinetic factors in maintaining order and control in the Spanish 
zone. The educational policies and practices that the Spaniards aimed at Moroccan 
Muslims, and to a lesser extent Jews, also revealed this tendency. The same can be 
said for other such undertakings, including public works and economic development 
projects and other elements of Spain’s “civilizing”--or, increasingly after World War 
II—“modernizing” policies, which paradoxically attempted to combine the Franco 
dictatorship’s traditionalist ideology of “National Catholicism” with the moderniza-
tion theory and the contemporary tenets of economic development. 51 At the same 
time, the peculiarly Spanish emphasis on the alleged “brotherhood” of Moroccans and 
Spaniards continued to leave its mark in the educational and other discourse through-
out this period.  
The Spanish state’s ideological vision of the Moroccan project was indeed 
unique in many ways, but it served a common imperialist purpose and the same kind 
of geopolitical and security-related concerns typical of other military occupations. 
There was certainly a difference in degree between the French and Spanish tolerance 
of Moroccan nationalism, for example, and the Spaniards made a bigger show of pre-
serving indigenous practices and beliefs. But the end goals of both European powers in 
North Africa were undeniably imperialist. Spanish administrators, for example, ech-
oed their French counterparts in seeking to use “native” schools for metropolitan 
                                                          
48 Manual para el Servicio del Oficial de Intervención en Marruecos: Madrid, Inspección General de Interven-
ción y Fuerzas Jalifianas, 1928. 
49 Goded had also recommended using Moroccans’ own codicia against them to gather intelligence and for 
other purposes. General GODED: op. cit., pp. 446, 449-450. 
50 For example, in Pedro MAESTRE: op. cit., which also served as sort of handbook for interventores. On the 
perceptions of Western military intelligence organizations of Islam and the “Arab world” and their role in 
colonialism, see Martin THOMAS: Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008, and Dina REZK: The Arab World and Western Intelligence: 
Analysing the Middle East, 1956-1981, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2018, chapter 1. 
51 Geoffrey JENSEN: “The Peculiarities of ‘Spanish Morocco’: Imperial Ideology and Economic Develop-
ment”, Mediterranean Historical Review 20:1 (2005), pp. 80-101. 
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ends, engendering loyalty to to the occupying power while preparing some young Mo-
roccans for service in the colonial administration.52 Along these lines, just as the su-
premo of French Morocco, General Hubert Lyautey, had adopted an explicitly “asso-
ciationist” approach in Morocco, the Spanish system preserved traditional power hier-
archies and administrative structures. Indeed, it would have been legally problematic 
for the Spaniards to do otherwise in a protectorate.  
Thus when Moroccan nationalists sought to gain control of the Spanish zone’s 
educational policy, which they rightly saw as a key weapon in the ongoing struggle for 
hearts and minds, the Spaniards employed a divide-and-conquer strategy typical of 
colonial occupation. Building upon the same allegedly innate Moroccan tendencies 
toward jealousy, treachery, and the creation of rivalries that Interventores were sup-
posed to exploit, Spanish policy makers attempted—in some cases with success—to 
turn possible agents of anti-Spanish Moroccan nationalism against each other. This is 
clear in the way the Spaniards ran the educational institutions and programs, which 
Moroccan nationalists sought to control.53 Hence in spite of the rhetoric about shared 
Hispano-Arabic traits and a common identity, Spain´s military officials tried to use 
supposedly innate characteristics of Moroccans—such as their “naturally” jealous dis-
position—as a means to control them, thus employing a typical colonialist playbook.  
Outwardly, Spanish protectorate authorities differed from their counterparts in 
other colonial territories by adopting a more conciliatory attitude toward indigenous 
nationalists, whose demands they made a point of publicly taking under considera-
tion. Indeed, the French considered the Spanish tolerance of the nationalists to be so 
excessive as to pose a danger to their own security, and not without reason. The Span-
ish zone’s authorities allowed the nationalists to disseminate their views publicly to a 
degree that would have been unthinkable in the French zone, and eventually Moroc-
can nationalists from the French zone began to take refuge in its Spanish counterpart 
to the north.54 Moroccan nationalists then returned the favor of Spain’s relative toler-
ance by causing fewer problems for Spanish authorities than for their French counter-
parts. But the relative quiet of the Spanish zone stemmed as much as anything from 
the nationalists’ knowledge that France represented a far greater obstacle to their fi-
                                                          
52 Irene GONZÁLEZ GONZÁLEZ: Spanish Education in Morocco, 1912-1956: Cultural Interactions in a 
Colonial Context, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2015.  
53 Ibidem. As González demonstrates, in fact with time Spanish control over educational policies in the pro-
tectorate increased, in spite of an official posture that conceded control of such matters to Moroccans., 
54 J. P. HALSTEAD: Rebirth of a Nation. The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism 1912-1944, Cam-
bridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 56. On the adoption of an ostensibly more conciliatory 
attitude to Moroccan nationalists by Spanish authorities during the 1930s than their French counterparts, 
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nal goal of independence than Spain, and that in the meantime they could take ad-
vantage of the relative freedom of the Spanish zone to pursue their agenda.55  
Yet this toleration of the Moroccan nationalists also served Spanish propagan-
da purposes, and no important Spanish military figure appears to have considered the 
possibility of Moroccan independence in anything but highly theoretical terms. More-
over, conflicts between the Spanish colonial authorities and Moroccan nationalist 
leaders hardly disappeared during the Second Republic or thereafter. Moroccans took 
advantage of this situation accordingly, tactically employing the discourse that they 
knew Spanish authorities wanted to hear about convivencia, brotherhood, and peace-
ful collaboration with Spain when it suited their own interests.56 Displaying a similar 
degree of cynicism, Spanish military administrators co-opted nationalist leaders and 
curbed educational reforms the Spaniards viewed as detrimental to metropolitan in-
terests. From the 1930s on, they attempted to placate the nationalists by giving them 
positions in educational delegations and soliciting their participation in reform pro-
jects.57  
The Spaniards’ main aim in incorporating the nationalists was to control po-
tential criticism, exemplified by their integration of Moroccan nationalists into the 
Supreme Council on Islamic Education. Spanish officials took these steps with the 
view that the supposedly natural Moroccan tendency toward rivalry would foment 
disputes between nationalist Moroccans on the Council. To ensure the success of this 
approach, the Spaniards placed Moroccans of opposing views in this and other such 
councils. It appears that Spain achieved at least some measure of success in these en-
deavors; the nationalists, in spite of their periodic protests about Spanish intervention 
and the gap between the promises and deeds of the colonial administration, clashed 
enough on key issues relating to education to hinder the formation of a united front.58  
 Admittedly, the official ideology of Spanish Morocco differed from that of oth-
er European colonial powers in its relatively low degree of alterism, and it is true that 
some of Spain’s leading africanistas continued to praise the perceived shared traits of 
Spaniards and their Moroccan “brothers” in ways unimaginable in the African territo-
ries occupied by many other European powers. But in their concrete actions, Spanish 
military authorities often copied other colonial armies in trying to take advantage of 
                                                          
55 José Luis NEILA HERNÁNDEZ: La segunda república española y el mediterráneo, Madrid, Dilema, 2006, 
pp. 197-209; Jean WOLF: Les secrets du Maroc espagnol. L’epopee d’Abd-el-Khaleq Torres, Paris and Casa-
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56 For example, the remarks by the prominent Moroccan nationalist Abdeljalak Torres quoted in Heraldo de 
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57 Irene GONZÁLEZ: op. cit. 
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The Spanish-Moroccan Military Campaigns….                                                                  Geoffrey Jensen 
 
 
RUHM Vol. 8, Nº 16 (2019), pp. 17 – 40 ©                          ISSN: 2254-6111                                          38 
 
the supposed cultural characteristics of the colonized to weaken resistance and antico-
lonial nationalism. The methods of the Spanish occupation served the same goals as 
the wars of conquest that Spain and other European powers had typically employed 
in their colonies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the Spanish campaigns in North Africa and the military presence that 
followed fit the basic mold of European colonial warfare and occupation, at least ac-
cording to the criteria I have employed here. The stages leading to the Spanish army’s 
eventual victory over Moroccan armed resistance depended upon customary military 
force but also various kinds of non-kinetic endeavors, demonstrating that political and 
civil actions joined military operations in determining the course and outcome of the 
decades-long history of the Spanish campaigns in Morocco. This conclusion should not 
come as a surprise. Prominent protagonists from both sides of colonial and peripheral 
wars and of various political and national stripes—from Hubert Lyautey to Mao 
Zedong to David Petraeus—have stressed the role of political, economic, cultural, and 
other non-kinetic elements of military operations in colonial wars and insurgencies. 
The Spanish case thus supports the argument that many of the most important char-
acteristics of colonial warfare transcend political and national boundaries.  
  Admittedly, counterinsurgency and colonial military doctrines, like “ways of 
war” in general, develop according to national-historical traditions. 59 It is not diffi-
cult, for example, to identify differences between British and French colonial military 
thinking. The counterinsurgency manuals and traditions of the British army, with 
their ostensible emphasis on minimum force and leaving a small footprint in occupied 
areas, differ considerably from the views of the French military officers in Algeria who 
developed the counterinsurgency theory of guerre révolutionnaire, which emphasized 
the “total” character of modern warfare and the supposed disappearance of a distinc-
tion between peace and war.60 In this last point, the advocates of guerre révolutionnaire 
revealed that they had broken free from the tendency among more conventional mili-
tary professionals to separate the traditional wartime use of military violence from the 
civil and political activities usually associated with occupation. For these French of-
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ficers, civil, military, political, cultural, and psychological activities all fit within the 
“the enlarged parameters of warfare.”61  
 The obvious differences between the French and the British approaches should 
not, however, blind us to what the two militaries had in common, and the Spanish 
case gives further support to the existence of shared characteristics in European colo-
nial warfare in general. The British may not have concurred with the “total” ap-
proach of the French advocates of guerre révolutionnaire, but they too appreciated the 
significance of the political and civil components of counterinsurgency. In fact, the 
British emphasis on the importance of politics and civil affairs in counterinsurgency, 
popularized in modern times by Sir Robert Thompson in Malaya and then enshrined 
in British doctrine, eventually found its way into the US Army and Marine Corps’ 
most recent manual on counterinsurgency.62 In short, Walter’s argument about the 
“primarily political” nature of colonial warfare is difficult to refute, and the ac-
ceptance of a similarly inclusive view of the sphere of military activities in Morocco 
eventually took hold among leading Spanish generals. As was true for their counter-
parts from other European colonial armies, however, it was not an easy intellectual 
shift to make. 
The Spanish case also conforms to historians’ observations about the tendency 
of European military leaders in colonial campaigns to think in conventional terms, 
seek decisive battles, elevate tactics to the level of strategy, overlook the political 
components of modern war, and then take more extreme measures when their conven-
tional tactics fail to produce the desired results.63 After Annual, however, Spanish mil-
itary and political leaders, like some of their more successful European counterparts 
elsewhere, understood the need to think more broadly about Spain’s means, ways, and 
ends in military and political terms, incorporating all into a comprehensive strategy. 
Goded understood that military success in Morocco entailed the use of all these ap-
proaches, even if he put much of his emphasis on traditional military force until Feb-
ruary 1926, when the army’s “political” endeavors to subdue the Rif rebellion began 
in earnest.64 Furthermore, he envisioned the military project in Morocco as encom-
passing both war and occupation, which together facilitated long-term pacification.  
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This kind of holistic approach to war and occupation, entailing analysis of mili-
tary mechanisms and patterns from a comparative perspective, could prove as useful 
to historians as to military practitioners, helping them to understand more fully the 
military history of Spain and Morocco. Historians of the Spanish army in North Afri-
ca, like the most noteworthy of the protagonists they study, would do well to rise 
above the “tactical” level and integrate analysis of politics, culture, and military and 
civil affairs, framing their findings within the parameters of transnational, “total” 
history. 
  
